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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, I have become increasingly interested 
in the nature of accounting knowledge.  is interest is 
not about getting satis ed by just  nding another set 
of empirical hypotheses con rmed. Rather, it is about 
understanding how such empirical con rmations of theory 
consistent expectations form true accounting knowledge. 
My de nition of true accounting knowledge extends 
the knowledge that we typically produce, exchange, and 
discuss in academic journals like the one you are reading. 
My de nition of true accounting knowledge includes 
the accounting knowledge that actors in the world of 
accounting can actually put to use. My quest to understand 
the nature of this true accounting knowledge thus refers to 
the question about the scienti c status of this knowledge, 
not merely in relation to the other academic  elds of 
social and economic research, but also with regard to 
the accounting practice. I believe that an assessment of 
these qualities of the accounting research, especially of 
the type that has come to dominate current accounting 
journals, is timely and useful.
My thesis is built upon the consideration that empirical 
accounting research has developed over the last decades at 
a staggering speed in quantitative terms. Also in qualitative 
terms, it is easy to conclude that its development has been 
impressive. Even a short glance at the statistical sections 
of an average academic accounting paper today and such 
a paper of some decades ago su  ces as comparison. It is 
less clear, however, that the relative positions of accounting 
research in the academic community have increased. 
Indeed, if we compare the ways in which the academic 
accounting discipline borrows from other academic 
disciplines and contributes to such other academic 
disciplines, the balance must be negative. Quanti cation 
of this comparison is di  cult, but it seems safe to assert 
that the amount of theories and concepts that accounting 
researchers import from economics, psychology and even 
– today – neuroscience provides a stark contrast with the 
interest that economists, psychologists and neuroscientists 
have in accounting phenomena.  e question whether 
this means that accounting research is stagnant, from 
an academic point of view, even despite its growth and 
development, is discussed and elaborated elsewhere (Basu, 
2012; Moser, 2012; Waymire, 2012). Herein, I would like 
to spend a few words on the relation between accounting 
research and accounting practice.
It is clear that my definition of true accounting 
knowledge is normative. Connotations of the word 
‘true’ are unavoidably positive and the implicit norm 
I would like to endorse is that accounting knowledge 
is usable by accounting practitioners.  is seems an 
empty statement, but it is not. I believe that accounting 
practitioners have very little understanding of the current 
academic accounting research, nor do they seem to care 
about it. If our goal is to produce – through academic 
accounting research – to help create true accounting 
research, our  rst step would be to understand why this 
demarcation between academics and practitioners exists. 
In the remainder of this text, I will  rst make the case 
for my practice-oriented de nition of true accounting 
knowledge.  en, I will propose a short analysis of the 
said demarcation, a er which I will end this paper with 
a short conclusion.
2. DEMARCATING ACCOUNTING RESEARCH FROM PRACTICE
To some extent, the discussion I would like to stimulate 
in the accounting community resembles that in economics 
or at least that observed in some circles of economists. 
Especially in continental Europe, economists have been 
dealing for a long time with a similar distinction between 
economics as an academic  eld of enquiry and economics 
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as a usable theory of economic choice. Note a comment 
by Rothbard (1973, p. 31) on the status of academic 
economics:
Let the nonspecialist in economics pick up a journal article or 
monograph today and contrast it with one of a generation ago, 
and the  rst thing that will strike him is the incomprehensibility 
of the modern product.  e older work was written in ordinary 
language and, with moderate e ort, was comprehensible to 
the layman; the current work is virtually all mathematics, 
algebraic or geometric. 
Let different things be different, but replacing 
‘economics’ in the text above with ‘accounting’ keeps 
much of the intended message of this paper intact, 
disregarding for the moment the time-shi  of more 
than four decades. Although the quote seems to critically 
address the increasing influence of mathematics in 
economics, which alienates the layman looking for 
economic advice, the problems lie deeper. One of those 
problems is that economics, or accounting, becomes a 
branch of mathematics, losing their own track, which 
results in second-best mathematics. Rothbard (1973, p. 
31) quotes undisclosed economists, lamenting that:
[…] Economics nowadays o en seems like a third-rate sub-
branch of mathematics, and one […] that the mathematician 
himself does not esteem very highly.
A second and even more fundamental problem of 
the said development is that the relation between what 
counts as ‘academic knowledge’ and ‘usable knowledge’ 
becomes unde ned. It is not so much a problem of 
the nonspecialist, who may simply lack the academic 
ability to understand mathematics, algebra, or geometry. 
Rather, the problem lies in the decreasing ability – or 
at least inclination – of academics to conduct their 
analyses with a subject specialist in mind. I would argue 
that much of our current academic work disregards the 
agency implications, i.e. the fact that knowledge should 
add to an agent’s behavioural repertoire. Much of this 
development in economics is discussed as the question 
whether economics should be seen as a natural or as a 
social science.  e implication of this distinction is that 
natural sciences should use naturalistic terms, which are 
easily subject to mathematical description. In contrast, 
social sciences make use of meaning-heavy constructs, for 
which mathematical analysis has little to o er. However, 
I believe that another framing of the question may be 
more useful to illustrate the cleavage between theory 
and practice in accounting. For accounting in particular, 
not just an expertise, but also an established profession, I 
propose that it is worthwhile to fundamentally consider 
the implicit levels of analysis we apply in our studies with 
regard to agency. With levels of analysis I mean those 
at which the theoretical patterns we aim to discover or 
interpret take place. Choosing a level of analysis  xates the 
phenomena of main interest, as well its causal antecedents 
and consequences.  e following section illustrates the 
concept and its consequences for accounting research.
3. THE THEORY-PRACTICE DEMARCATION AND LEVELS OF ANALYSIS IN 
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
Let us return to the accounting agent, the subject 
specialist, who has to deal with practical situations in which 
accounting knowledge may help determining a course of 
action.  is agent may be a nonspecialist when it comes to 
understanding academic accounting research, but what is 
there to pro t from current accounting research? I believe 
that distinguishing three levels of analysis in current 
accounting research helps to better understand how true 
accounting knowledge, as de ned above, may di er from 
the accounting knowledge as produced, exchanged and 
discussed in the current mainstream academic accounting 
literature.  e three levels of analysis relate to the personal 
, sub-personal, and supra-personal levels.
At the personal level of analysis (the accountant as 
a free agent), we would expect to  nd studies whose 
outcome immediately informs accountants about practical 
solutions to practical problems. Moreover, at this level of 
analysis, knowledge is cast in terms that are meaningful 
to the agent.  is is not a trivial feature, as the issue of 
meaningfulness is itself a matter of deep philosophical 
debate in the social sciences. Nevertheless, the discussion 
is not just about the di erence between hermeneutics and 
positivism. It is, quite simply, just one thing to conclude 
that accountants may su er from social bias in decision 
making settings [Hartmann and Maas (2010) investigated 
under what conditions business unit (BU) controllers 
engaged in the creation of budgetary slack under social 
pressure.  ey found evidence of interactive e ects of 
personality (Machiavellianism) involvement in decision 
making] and quite another thing to provide advice to 
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accountants about how to solve, evade or avoid settings in 
which this might happen. In fact, the distinction between 
having knowledge about an agent and knowledge that is 
useful to the agent is fundamental, and far from trivial. It 
requires alignment between the accountants’ and academic 
researchers’ conceptualization of the accountants’ work. In 
fact, however, practitioners talk about their work in trivial, 
‘folk,’ terms and academic researchers seem uneasy to deal 
with that, as it becomes evident from the predominance 
of psychology at this level of analysis.  e question whose 
problem this is, the researcher’s or the practitioner’s, and 
what true accounting knowledge looks like should be 
 rmly established in the agenda of accounting academics.
At the supra-personal level of analysis (the accountant 
as part of a larger system), we  nd academic output 
showing how accountants’ behaviours operate in 
larger structures, such as economic markets. Typical 
examples include economic models of organizations 
or markets in which accountants or auditors function 
according to certain micro-economic patterns.  ese 
studies have mostly an ‘as-if ’ approach.  e behaviour 
of organizations and markets is explained through the 
agency of accountants, ‘as-if ’ they were maximizing 
utility, averting risks, avoiding losses, and all that. Here 
the barrier between the academic analyses and the folk 
theory of the practitioner becomes more visible, not 
merely because of a fundamental di erence in vocabulary, 
but rather in the outright denial of the accountant as an 
individual free-willed agent.  e question here is how 
larger-system optimal structures can inform individual 
agents, and if they can whether they should follow this 
information. Again, the question comes up: what counts 
as true accounting knowledge here? In the light of space 
and time, I once more limit myself to raise the question 
as signi cant to accounting academics, without providing 
an answer. 
Most recently, a third level of analysis has been 
introduced to the accounting literature, which lies at 
the sub-personal level of analysis (the accountant as a 
collection of internal processes). Under the explosive 
growth of cognitive and social neuroscience elsewhere, 
some early adopter papers have investigated neural, 
biological, drivers of accountant’s agency (Eskenazi, 
Rietdijk, & Hartmann, 2016).  ese authors build on 
Hartmann and Maas (2010), predicting that the e ect 
of social pressure may be explained by the accountant’s 
biological make-up. Mirror neuron system functionality 
is used to explain the accountants’ vulnerability. Di erent 
from the personal level of analysis and similar to the 
supra-personal level of analysis, this sub-personal level of 
analysis does not provide immediate input for agency. In 
other words, and to give a practical example, it is simply 
impossible for an accountant to change the biological 
structure that, apparently, (co-)determines behaviour. 
However, the di erence between sub- and supra-personal 
levels of analysis is fundamental. While the sub-personal 
aims to discover drivers of behaviour of the person, 
including such ‘mystical’ drivers as ‘biases,’ ‘preferences,’ 
and ‘moods,’ and are therefore best understood as real 
constituents of personal behaviour, the supra-personal 
knowledge lacks this quality, both because of its ‘as-if ’ 
nature and because of its (implicit) denial of individual 
agency. Overall, the knowledge consequences of this 
level for individual accounting agents also deserves 
fundamental scrutiny, even if the outcome is that true 
accounting knowledge cannot be de ned as this level.
Casual observation provides many examples of 
accounting research conducted within one of the three 
levels of analysis just speci ed. While the above sketch 
is clearly incomplete in both overviewing relevant and 
informative accounting studies and in spelling out the 
consequences of the level of analysis view, it hopefully 
serves to provide a grid for the discussion about where on 
the continuum from natural science to folk practice we 
should place academic research aimed at true accounting 
knowledge.
4. CONCLUSIONS
It is not easy, and even quite risky, to generalize 
about accounting research and accounting researchers, 
as researchers and their research di er substantially in 
terms of scope, intellectual orientation, and research 
topic. However, I think it is fair to generally argue that the 
mere existence of academic accounting journals suggests 
that accounting is a topic of academic work that has at 
least some common characteristics in the large variety 
of accounting streams, themes and researchers. In this 
paper I have tried to establish a preliminary argument for 
a further understanding of the divide between accounting 
theory and accounting practice. Rather than imposing 
a view on how accounting research should be done or 
should be understood, I hope that the considerations 
concerning the levels of analysis in contemporary 
accounting research help our beautiful discipline to further 
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advance, as they point to three distinct barriers between 
theory and practice, which may serve as clear targets for 
reconciliation. Accounting as a practical discipline is too 
important to accept its academic stagnation, even if only 
in the intellectual debate, as the pay-o  of true accounting 
knowledge is potentially in nite (cf. Basu, 2012; Moser, 
2012; Waymire, 2012).
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